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Overcoming the tradition of metaphysics’ forgetting of the world and restoring the principal 
status of the world is the fundamental assertion of the movement of 20th century’s philosophi-
cal cosmology, and the ontology of univocity which is the centrepiece of Deleuze’s metaphys-
ics of difference can be considered precisely as an important moment of this movement. Fol-
lowing the footsteps of Karl Löwith and Eugen Fink both of whom strive to surpass the tradi-
tional metaphysics in its medieval theological and modern subjectivist figures and think the 
World-Nature in a non-metaphysical manner, Deleuze has been well aware of the significance 
of Heraclitean original intuition of the world for the construction of ontology, that is to say, the 
ontology worthy of the name should be founded upon the World, be it cosmic or chaosmic, 
which is of a non-numerical unicity and of which both the divine and the human are only 
the modalities. Furthermore, he deepens this intuition through a reworking of Spinozism, 
especially the Spinozean theory of attributes as doubly infinite univocal forms and ultimately 
poses the Heraclito-Spinozean Nature-World as the common ontological condition of both 
the infinite and the finite and as the principle of individuation of all the intraworldy spatio-
temporal beings. Hereby under the influence of the two German philosophers and through a 
deepening of their Heracliticism, Deleuze has established his own theory of World-Nature, i.e. 
ontology of univocity which has found its clearest and most profound expression in his crea-
tive interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of attributes.
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What kind of philosophy does Deleuze bring to us? When Deleuze was still regarded 
as a “postmodern philosopher”, the answers to this question may be “philosophy of be-
coming”, “philosophy of desire”, “philosophy of body”, etc. However, as people nowa-
days have acknowledged that Deleuze is a metaphysician stricto sensu1, the answer to 
the above question became accordingly transcendental empiricism or ontology of im-
manence2. Compared with the post-modern characterizations of Deleuze’s philosophical 
enterprise, the above answer, instead of staying on the level of derived consequences, 
focuses on the fundamental principles of Deleuzean metaphysics of difference: while 
transcendental empiricism exhibits the demand to go beyond the conditions of possible 
experience and give a genetic explanation of real experience or sensible being, ontology 
1 In a letter to Arnaud Villani, Deleuze famously writes: “Je me sens pur metaphysician” [I feel myself 
to be a pure metaphysician]. Cf. [1, p. 130].
2 This second kind of interpretation has found one of its finest expressions in Levy Bryant’s brilliant 
book. Cf. [2].
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of immanence reveals that both subjective consciousness and object as correlative of con-
sciousness are only the empirical effects of the plane of immanence. However, is it still 
possible to give a third kind of response which, being not content with staying within the 
explicit framework of Deleuzean philosophy, attempts to regard it as a concrete expres-
sion or moment of a more wide-ranging general philosophical movement? Our answer 
is affirmative. Of course, we do not wish to include Deleuze into the “genealogy of mi-
nor philosophers” conceived by himself (e. g. the genealogy of minor post-Kantians of 
Maimon — Nietzsche — Bergson opposed to the genealogy of major post-Kantians of 
Fichte-Schelling-Hegel) as a lot of commentators are fond of doing, because doing this 
means still staying within the exoteric Deleuzean scheme. In contrast, our preferred an-
swer is as the following: Deleuze’s philosophy belongs essentially to the twentieth century’s 
movement of philosophical cosmology the representatives of which, besides Deleuze, are 
Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon on the French side, Eugen Fink, Hans Jonas and 
Karl Löwith on the German side3. Generally speaking, this philosophical cosmology em-
braces the following three fundamental propositions: (1) World-Cosmos is Being, God 
conceived as center by medieval theology and Man conceived as center by modern meta-
physics of subjectivity are nothing but modes of World-Being; (2)  World is definitely 
not the aggregation of numerous empirical beings, but the (non-Kantian) transcendental 
condition which renders them possible. It is in this sense the productive and living prin-
ciple of individuation; (3) World-Time is not the empirical succession of “nows”, but a 
non-temporal eternity which renders possible the empirical passage of time. The aim of 
this paper is to demonstrate departing from this cosmological perspective that the ontol-
ogy of univocity, centrepiece of Deleuzean metaphysics of difference, is an elaboration 
of the first two propositions of the philosophical cosmology. Moreover, we will show 
that this Deleuzean ontology of univocity is constructed through reviving the Heraclito-
Spinozism. In order to uncover the problem of the world in Deleuze’s philosophy, we will 
start from a later text of his which has received little attention from the scholars but is 
nonetheless of prime importance.
I. The Philosophical Turning from the Original Infinitude 
to the Constituent Finitude Has Forgotten the Problem of World
The turning from the philosophie à l’âge classique of seventeenth century to the mod-
ern philosophy of which Kantian transcendentalism is the representative is of fundamen-
tal importance in Deleuze’s later thought. In his lecture course on Leibniz dated 20 May 
1980, Deleuze considered this turning as that from the philosophy of infinitude the fun-
damental concern of which is to create the world like God to the philosophy of finitude 
which consists in the foundation within a world already there (or in Kantian terms: in 
the categorial determination of appearances in space and time)4 like a hero. Later in two 
3 Czech philosopher Jan Patočka whose opus magnum Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém [The Nat-
ural World as a Philosophical Problem] has been translated into English recently should also be included [3]. 
It deserves mention that Pierre Montebello has given an excellent account of this philosophical cosmology, 
especially its French side, in his three important works. Cf. [4–6]. 
4 In fact, the rudiment of this point is the following thesis concerning the turning from classical art 
to romantic art expounded in A Thousand Plateaus: distinguished from the classical artist who creates like 
God, the romantic artist founds like hero. Cf. [7, p. 338–340].
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of his Foucault lecture courses dated respectively 19 November 1985 and 26 November 
1985, Deleuze provided a more elaborated account of this turning the essential of which 
has been integrated into the appendix of the 1986 published Foucault: “On the Death of 
Man and Superman” [8, p. 124–132]. Then how should we understand this significant 
philosophical turning?
Under the influence of Martin Heidegger and Jules Vuillemin, Deleuze believed that 
what characterizes the finitude which definitely became the fundamental problem of 
philosophy is the fact that the knowing subject is composed by two heterogeneous and 
equal faculties that are the receptive sensibility and the spontaneous understanding. By 
contrast, one of the fundamental theses of the philosophy of infinitude of seventeenth 
century is that sensibility is ultimately not an independent faculty but a secondary or 
derived form of understanding, that is to say, sensibility and understanding are homo-
geneous in principle; accordingly, sensible givens are no more than the secondary or 
derived figures of ideas or concepts belonging to the understanding [8, p. 124–127]. That 
being the case, what could be the ground of this thesis of infinitude? The answer to this 
question concerns the influence exerted upon the philosophie à l’âge classique by Chris-
tian theology. In the framework of Christian theology, God’s creation, creatio ex nihilo, 
involves no external matter and is distinguished for this reason from the act of creation 
of Demiurge described by Plato in Timaeus. If translating this theologico-metaphysical 
thesis into epistemological terms, we can obtain the following proposition: from the 
perspective of infinitude, the act of knowing or cognizing involves no sensible given 
from without. Philosophers are certainly finite creatures who have no access to the di-
vine knowledge, this fact nevertheless does not prevent them from affirming that infini-
tude should be posed as the principle of cognition. In other words, although the human 
knowledge consists on the factual level in sensations and concepts, the former can be 
reduced in principle to the latter.
However, as we have already indicated, sensibility and understanding became in the 
Kantian philosophy of finitude two independent, heterogeneous and equal faculties which 
cannot be reduced to one another, and both the sensible givens and the intellectual con-
cepts serve as the legitimate sources of cognition. So what’s the significance of this? The 
fact that sensible givens have an irreducible existence means that man’s act of knowing is 
not at all self-sufficient. Radically different from God who creates his objects of cognition 
by his infinite act of knowing, i. e. original intellectual intuition, man’s finite act of know-
ing is conditioned by the already given external objects, that is to say, the insurmountable 
inner finitude itself became the principle. Moreover, the impotence to create the world 
form nothingness like God does not suggest that the human acts of knowing are purely 
and simply passive as they have their own way of acting transcendentally, that is to say, 
founding the world transcendentally, and this is precisely what is implicated in the well-
known Kantian formula “man is the law-giver of nature”. Through pure spatial-temporal 
forms and categories of understanding, man as knowing subject constitutes the empirical 
world in the infinite continuum of space and time. God who creates the world from noth-
ingness has retreated from view, Man who transcendentally founds the world became the 
center of philosophical landscape. As Deleuze has written by imitating Nietzsche’s Zara-
thustra: Incipit Homo [8, p. 127].
In the following part of “On the Death of Man and Superman”, Deleuze raises the fol-
lowing question: in our present times, after the God-centered âge classique and the Man-
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centered modern times, what should be taken as the foundation of contemporary philoso-
phy? His own answer to this question is that it is Superman who provides us with the pos-
sibility of the future philosophy. However, if taking a closer look at Deleuze’s exposition 
of the “historical formation” of modern thought, we could discover another question that 
has not been raised explicitly by Deleuze, a question of fundamental importance for our 
adequate understanding of his philosophy. As we have seen, with the transition from orig-
inal infinitude to constituent finitude, the supreme place of God has been taken by Man, 
and the world changed accordingly from God’s creation to Man’s object of foundation. It is 
noteworthy that God, Man, and World are respectively the subjects of the three disciplines 
of metaphysica specialis, i. e., rational theology, psychology, and cosmology. Based on the 
above exposition, it is legitimate to claim that the history of philosophy can be interpreted 
to some extent as driven by the changing relationships between these three subjects. Nev-
ertheless, although the relationship between God and Man has changed radically with 
the arrival of modern philosophy stricto sensu, World is still a pure passive being which, 
though not created by a transcendent God from nothingness, is founded or constituted 
by a transcendental Man-Subject. As for the active and founding origin, it seems that we 
could only make a choice between the infinite creating God or the finite founding Man. 
But is this alternative necessary? Does there exist the possibility that World can enjoy a 
supreme status? Or more precisely, can World become the priori condition of possibility 
of both God and Man? Can we expect on the philosophical level Incipit Mundus? We will 
lump all these questions together under the heading of the problem of world and dem-
onstrate that the Deleuzean ontology of univocity is exactly a solution to this problem5. 
Of course, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the problem of the world 
is not confronted by Deleuze alone but a common subject for a number of twentieth-
century continental philosophers. Moreover, some of these philosophers have posed and 
elaborated the problem of the world in a manner much more direct than Deleuze, and two 
representatives of them are Karl Löwith and Eugen Fink. In order to elucidate the problem 
of the world and shed some light on the extent to which Deleuze has been inspired by his 
predecessor, we will give a brief account of Löwith’s and Fink’s discussions of the problem 
in the next section.
II. A rediscovery of the Heraclitean Original Intuition of the World
Whether conceived as divine creation in the framework of philosophie de l’âge clas-
sique or as object of transcendental foundation or constitution by Kant, the world as me-
chanical and extended physical nature is essentially devoid of life or spirit. If such a world 
is the result of the secularization, i. e. de-divination, of the Christian creationism, then 
the world understood in the scheme of Christianity as created and temporal results for its 
5 Indeed, when expounding his theory of univocal being, Deleuze himself never mentions explicitly the 
problem of world, but this does not mean that this problem is not important for him. Moreover, as we will 
see below, Deleuze’s theory of univocal being can be legitimately seen as a response to this problem. And 
Deleuze himself declares many times that philosophers do not always tell us their problems that need to be 
discovered by commentators: “Philosophers introduce new concepts, they explain them, but they don’t tell 
us, not completely anyway, the problems to which those concepts are a response… The history of philoso-
phy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for granted, what he 
didn’t say but is nonetheless present in what he did say” [9, p. 136]. 
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part from the secularization of the Greek conception of the world — this is the conclusion 
drew by Karl Löwith on the basis of his Geistesgeschite studies [10, p. 305–306]6.
So, how was the world conceived before the first secularization of Christian creation-
ism and the second secularization of modern philosophy of subjectivity? According to 
Löwith, the Greek conception of World finds its clearest expression in Heraclitus’ Frag-
ment 30 in Diel’s collection of the Fragments of the Presocratics: “the world (κόσμος), the 
same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire everliving, 
kindled in measures and in measures going out” [12, p. 45] (translation modified). This 
Heraclitean original intuition reveals the three fundamental characteristics of the World: 
First, World is not “one” in the numerical sense of the word, because it does not coexist on 
the same level with the finite individual beings, that says, only the intraworldy beings have 
the numerically determined existences. In other words, it is neither an enormous world-
thing nor an aggregation of numerous intraworldy things, but the universal condition 
which makes all the intraworldy beings to be what they are. It is precisely in this sense that 
the World can be called One [10, p. 296]; second, World is neither the creation of God nor 
the constitution of Man, it is, on the contrary, the priori condition of both God and Man. 
Neither is God world-transcending nor is Man the center of the world, because both of 
them are intraworldy beings [13, p. 8]; third, World is not subject to the passing time and 
advancing history on the human level, its nature is of the aeternitas which have nothing to 
do with the sempiternitas [10, p. 302].
Based upon this Heraclitean original intuition, Löwith defines the world in the fol-
lowing manner: The World is “the One and Totality of all the beings from Nature (das Eine 
und Ganze alles von Natur aus Seienden)” [10, p. 296]. Such a divine and eternal world has 
been de-powered (depontenziert) and de-natured (denaturiert) by the Christian creation-
ism [10, p. 305]: on the one hand, it has been deprived of its divinity and became conse-
quently subordinated to God; on the other hand, it became the temporal and historico-
existential background of human beings who are now the image of God. Expressing no 
more the world-order, man must despise and abandon the world instead, because “anyone 
chooses to be a friend of the world becomes an enemy of God”; “if any man loves the 
world, the love of the Father is not in him.” In the early stage of modern times, Descartes 
has laid the foundation for the modern understanding of the world by conceiving the al-
ready non-divine and temporal world as mechanical and extended. Although Husserl and 
Heidegger have attempted to go beyond Descartes by respectively conceiving the world 
6 Generally speaking, people are always conscious of the affinity between Fink’s cosmological phe-
nomenology and Heidegger’s metaphysics of world. Alexander Schnell, for example, reminds us that “Hei-
degger s’intéressera à partir de 1927–1928, à la sphère qui rend possible l’ouverture à tout étant et que Heidegger 
continue à appeler le “monde’” Nous verrons qu’il y a des indices évidents qui laissent à penser qu’à la fin des 
années 1920, Heidegger projetait de substituer une ‘cosmologie’, c’est-à-dire une métaphysique du monde, à la 
pensée de l’être — une orientation qu’il a abandonée au profit d’une philosophie de l’histoire de l’être et que son 
disciple Eugen Fink poursuivra, lui, après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale” (from 1927–1928, Heidegger will be 
interested in the sphere which makes possible the opening to all beings and which Heidegger continues to 
call the ‘world’. We will see that there are clear indications which make one think that Heidegger, at the end 
of the 1920s, planned to substitute a ‘cosmology’, that is to say a metaphysics of world, for the thought of 
Being — an orientation which he abandoned in favour of a philosophy of history of Being and which will 
be pursued by his disciple Eugen Fink after the Second World War) [11, p. 44–45]. What has always been 
overlooked however is that Löwith who is also a disciple of Heidegger’s has established his own philosophy 
of World-Nature in a critical dialogue with Heidegger’s theory of the world.
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as Totalhorizont and Weltentwurf, this nevertheless does not change the fact that World is 
still subordinated to Man [10, p. 295].
Of course, Löwith is not alone in being well aware of the importance of the Hera-
clitean original intuition. In Play as Symbol of the World, Eugen Fink attempted to con-
struct a phenomenology of the world or phenomenological cosmology which takes as an 
object the world in itself and for itself7. It is noteworthy that the Finkian phenomenology 
of the world also highlights the significance of Fragment 30: “ ‘World-order,’ kosmos, is the 
beautiful dispensation of things and events that link them all together, that impresses a 
character of totality upon them and gathers them into a structured unity” [15, p. 49]. Like 
Löwith, Fink suggests that we should rule out two misunderstandings about the world: 
first, the world is neither an enormous extended being nor an aggregation of finite indi-
vidual beings, it is strictly speaking non-thing or non-object; second, the world is neither 
a regulative Idea of subjective reason nor Dasein’s constitutive determination or moment, 
as the emerging and the perishing of human subjects are only effects of the cosmic move-
ment. That is to say, the world is “the total field of the actual. There is only one actuality, 
however many dimensions it may have. The one total actuality is not first assembled from 
many individual actual beings, however, but rather actuality tout court gathers together 
every individual-actual thing in advance” [15, p. 83]. The world(-order) therefore is an 
infinite-dimensional totality which precedes ontologically all the parts that are the indi-
vidual beings and serves as the latter’s condition of possibility.
However, distinct from Löwith who seems simply affirm the world as “totality as 
such” and its independence from and priority in relation to God and Man, Fink further 
put forward the question of the relationship between the world and the intraworldy be-
ings, i. e. that of the mechanism of individuation. According to Fink, it is the movement 
of individuation which characterizes the world not as static ready-made being but as an 
infinite power which produces and creates. Production and creation are thus life of the 
world: “The course of the world enjoins all individual beings; it allows them to emerge 
and perish, to grow and to shrivel; it brings things into their individuation and takes them 
away from it again — it occurs as the universal individuation (universelle Vereinzelung) of 
all finitely existing beings. The universal being-in-the-world of all finite things in general 
as belonging within the cosmos does not, therefore, mean a static, stationary relation, but 
rather the belonging of things within the prevailing of worldwide individuation, within 
the cosmic process of individuation” [15, p. 72–73]. The reason why Christian theology 
deprived the world of its power of producing and creating is that it understands God as the 
sole creator of all the non-divine beings and treats the world once seen as infinite power 
of creation and individuation as a simple accumulation of the created individual beings. 
In this regard, both Löwith’s and Fink’s philosophies can be considered as efforts to restore 
the totality, infinity, eternity, and creativity of the world, that is to say, to restore the Hera-
clitean original intuition of the world.
We claim that Deleuze’s philosophy belongs essentially to the genealogy of this phi-
losophy of world or philosophical cosmology. If this is indeed the case, to what extent 
can we say that Deleuze’s own consciousness of the problem has been influenced by Lö-
with and Fink? For Deleuze, Löwith is above all an outstanding interpreter of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. In his concluding remarks at the Royaumont Conference on Nietzsche held 
7 Cf. [14]. Fink’s another important work can be considered as the prolegomena to this book. Cf. [15]. 
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in July 1964, Deleuze mentioned that Löwith analyzed “in a masterful presentation” the 
nature of nihilism and Nietzsche’s effort to overcome nihilism. It deserves special men-
tion that Deleuze highlighted Löwith’s assertion that the manner in which Nietzsche goes 
beyond nihilism is through “a real recuperation of the world” [16, p. 120]. It is legitimately 
therefore for us to affirm that Deleuze is not at all ignorant of Löwith’s theory of the world, 
at least in the form of Löwithian interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return 
of the same. Deleuze’s relation to Fink at the philosophical level, in comparison, is much 
more direct8. The latter’s Play as a Symbol of the World has exerted upon Deleuze’s early 
philosophy, especially his theory of Idée-Être, an influence far from unimportant9. Moreo-
ver, if there exists in Deleuze some kind of Heraclitism, this must have been formed under 
the influence of Fink (and, to some extent, Kostas Axelos10).
Of course, this does not mean that Deleuze cannot raise the question of the world 
unless with the aid of Löwith’s and Fink’s works. It is of fundamental importance never-
theless to reveal at the factual level the affinity and similarity between thinkers who are 
often regarded as belonging to completely different camps. However, the affinity and 
similarity does not eliminate their remarkable difference: If Löwith and Fink attempt to 
restore the philosophical cosmology as philosophy of world through a return to Hera-
clitus’ thought, Deleuze, for his part, has effectuated the restoration ultimately through 
a return to Spinoza (Moreover, as we will see below, Deleuze, like Schelling, Hölderlin, 
and Hegel before him, is well aware of the affinity between Spinoza and Heraclitus). 
Furthermore, while both Löwith’s and Fink’s philosophical cosmologies take “cosmos” 
or “world-order” as their leading concept, the fundamental concept posed by Deleuze 
is “chaosmos”, i.  e. Nature as the world “in which individuations are impersonal, and 
singularities are pre-individual”11. As we have seen, Löwith believes that the modern 
metaphysics of subjectivity which never breaks free from the influence of Christian the-
ology implies a decrease in power of Nature-World. To this, Deleuze has given a perfect 
response in the conclusion of Spinoza and the Problem of Expression: Spinoza’s philoso-
phy is “a rediscovery of Nature and her power” and “a recreating of ontology”. Thus, this 
ontology of nature, according to which “Being determined as God… expresses himself 
in the world”, can be considered as “a new materialism” [20, p. 321]12. Such a philosophy 
in which Nature, Being, and World become one still has to face the Heraclitean ques-
tion: how can the world, no god nor man has made, be the same for all? Deleuze’s answer 
to this question is his theory of univocity of being.
8 Dai Takeuchi has made a concise comparative study of the two philosophers in [17].
9 Cf. [18, p. 197–199; 19, p. 58–65].
10 See the two reviews written by Deleuze for the works of this famous French proponent of Heraclitean 
thought: “How Jarry’s Pataphysics Opened the Way for Phenomenology” and “The Fissure of Anaxagoras 
and the Local Fires of Heraclitus”, in [16, p. 74–76, 156–161]. 
11 Cf. [18, p. xxi, 123–124, 199].
12 It is noteworthy that Löwith, when expounding Spinoza’s idea of “world of nature (Welt der Natur)”, 
has made an assertion quite similar to that of Deleuze‘s: “Die essentia Gottes oder der Natur schließt in dem 
Faktum ihrer extentia deren wesentliche potentia ein (The essentia of God or Nature implicates in the fact of 
its extentia its essential potentia)” [21, p. 241].
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III. Deleuze’s Heraclito-Spinozean Reconstruction 
of the Ontology of Univocity
The ontology of univocity is of course not Deleuze’s own invention. In Difference and 
Repetition, he locates the beginning of ontology of univocity in Duns Scotus [18, p. 39]. 
From the perspective of a common discourse of history of philosophy, the ontology of 
univocity itself is a solution to one of the central problems of medieval scholasticism: how 
can the finite understanding of human being acquire knowledge of God? The reason why 
Duns Scotus is against the theory of analogia entis endorsed by Thomas Aquinas and oth-
ers and proposed his ontology of univocity is that only the latter can guarantee that man’s 
finite understanding is capable of acquiring knowledge of God. Such being the case, can 
the ontology of univocity have any actual philosophical significance once abstracted from 
its theological context? As we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the first 
theme of Heraclitean cosmology is that both God and man are modes of World-Being. 
If we recall that in the philosophical context God stands for infinitude and man finitude, 
we can translate the above proposition into the following form: both “infinite” and “finite” 
are modes of World-Being. In this way, we can see clearly the relationship between Scotic 
ontology and Heraclitean cosmology as the univocal being conceived by Duns Scotus pre-
cisely has “infinite” and “finite” as its modus intrinsecus13. According to the mainstream 
theory of analogia entis in the scholasticism, although being of God and being of creatures 
share the same name “being”, there’s a difference in nature between the former’s infinite 
being and the latter’s finite being and it is because the latter serves as the former’s analog 
that it can have its own being14. But in Duns Scotus’ view, just as the difference of intensity 
between a deep red and a light red will not turn them into two different colors, infinite be-
ing and finite being, on the conceptual level, are nothing but two modalities or two intensi-
ties of one and the same being. However, in order to avoid pantheism, Duns Scotus only 
conceived abstractly univocal being as a neuter concept which is neither infinite nor finite 
in itself15, and the position he adopted on the level of reality is still that of the analogia entis. 
On the contrary, the significance of univocal being in the true sense of the words consists 
precisely in the affirmation not on the conceptual level but on the level of reality of the 
community of infinite being and finite being. Reconstructing the ontology of univocity 
after Duns Scotus means, therefore, realizing the transition from the conceptually neuter 
univocal being to the really affirmative univocal being; it is just for effectuating such a 
transition that Deleuze turned to Spinoza.
However, when elaborating the contribution made by Spinoza to the ontology of uni-
vocity in his Spinoza lecture course dated 24  March 1981, Deleuze took precisely as a 
point of departure the famous Heraclitean formula “ἓν πάντα (One-All)”16. According 
to him, “ἓν πάντα” is the most fundamental ontological proposition whose philosophical 
consequence has found its purest and perfect expression in Spinoza’s ontology the central 
proposition of which is Deus sive Natura. And the centerpiece of this Heraclito-Spinozean 
13 Cf. Ordinatio, I, dist. 8, pars. 1, qu. 3, n. 108, in [22, IV, p. 202–203; 20, p. 191].
14 Cf. Summa theologia, Ia, qu. 44, a.1, in [23, IV, p. 455]; Summa contra Gentiles, I. 34, in [23, XIII, 
p. 103].
15 Cf. Ordinatio, I, dist. 8, pars. 1, qu. 3, n. 81, in [22, p. 190; 18, p. 39].
16 Cf. [12, p. 45]. “οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι 
(It is wise, listening not to me but to the report, to agree that all things are one)”.
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ontology is the theory of attributes which renders possible on the level of reality the uni-
vocal being: “Attributes are univocal or common forms, predicated, in the same form, of 
creatures and creator, products and producer, formally constituting the essence of one, 
formally containing the essence of the others” [20, p. 102–103]. In this regard, Nature-Be-
ing-Attributes, although conceived by Spinoza as strictly univocal, is definitely not a genus 
subsuming substance as infinite being and mode as finite being under itself as secondary 
concepts; it is, in fact, the reality constitutive both of the substance and the modes. On the 
one hand, the attributes are quantitatively infinite and as genetic elements constitute the 
substance as absolutely infinite Multiplicity. On the other hand, each attribute as an infi-
nite quality is an actually infinite series which implicates within itself the modal essences 
as intensities or intensive parts which, although distinguished from one another, are in-
divisible17. If the crucial move by which Duns Scotus demonstrates the neutrality of be-
ing is to announce that the univocal being does not correspond to any reality, Deleuzean 
Spinozism’s crucial move, on the contrary, is to affirm the full reality of univocal being, 
that is to say, to affirm that infinite being and finite being have their real and not simply 
conceptual community in the attributes.
If the theory of attributes provides by furthering the Scoticism an elaboration of the 
first thesis of philosophical cosmology according to which world is the “one” or “same” for 
all, then how to proceed with the second thesis concerning the principle of individuation? 
In fact, when declaring following Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinozism that the attributes 
as univocal being implicate within themselves an infinity of intensive parts each of which 
is the singular essence of a finite individuated being, we have partially answered this ques-
tion. Distinguished from the Aristotelian framework of specification within which the 
principle of individuation can only resort to the externality of accident or matter due to 
the impossibility of directly relating to being, Spinoza’s Heraclitean onto-cosmology af-
firms that attributes as a principle of individuation relate directly to the individuals or 
more precisely individual or singular essences. In other words, being is the principle of in-
dividuation without the intermediation of genus or species. Furthermore, this Heraclito-
Spinozean onto-cosmology determines the essences of all beings as a power which, unlike 
potential possibility, is always actual. Hence the attributes are a real ontological condition 
of the deploying of God’s creative power, that is to say, the infinite substance produces 
an infinity of modes through the attributes and within the attributes. Accordingly, the 
attributes, rather than “containing” finite individual beings’ essences statically, should be 
considered as expressing substance’s infinite power dynamically18.
Let us conclude this paper by briefly summarizing our findings. As two representa-
tives of the continental philosophical cosmology of the twentieth century, Löwith and 
Fink, both of whom have resorted to the Heraclitean original intuition of the world, 
have laid the foundation of an onto-cosmology which goes beyond the traditional meta-
physics interpreted by Heidegger as onto-theology by determining the two fundamental 
characteristics of World-Nature: (1) it is of a non-numerical, i.e. transcendental unicity 
and can be understood therefore as a totum analyticum in the Kantian sense; (2) it is the 
principle of individuation of all the finite intraworldy beings. Under the influence of 
the two German philosophers and through a deepening of their Heracliticism, Deleuze 
has established his own theory of World-Nature, i.e. ontology of univocity which has 
17 Cf. [20, p. 196–198]. 
18 Cf. [20, p. 89–95].
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found its clearest and most profound expression in his creative interpretation of Spinoza’s 
theory of attributes. According to this interpretation, (1)  the attributes are ontological 
community (univocity) which is not neutral but real, they are the constitutive condition 
of the infinite substance on the one hand and, as actually infinite series, implicate within 
themselves the singular essences of the finite beings on the other hand; (2) the univocal 
being that is the attributes is the principle of individuation of all the intraworldy beings 
as it not only implicates the individual essences but is also that through which the ab-
solutely infinite substance expresses the power as its inner nature and thus produces an 
infinity of modes.
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В данной статье эксплицируется онтология единства как центральный элемент ме-
тафизики различия Делёза, рассматриваемой автором в  контексте движения фило-
софской космологии XX в. В преодолении традиции метафизического забвения мира 
и восстановлении статуса мира в современной философии Делёз следует за К. Левицем 
и О. Финком, которые стремились превзойти традиционную метафизику в ее средне-
вековых богословских и новоевропейских субъективистских образцах. В отличие от 
названных выше мыслителей, трактовавших мир-природу в неметафизическом ключе, 
сам Делёз отчетливо понимал важность оригинальной интуиции греческого философа 
Гераклита для построения онтологии. Онтология, достойная собственного названия, 
должна основываться на Мире, космическое (упорядоченное) или хаотическое бытие 
которого имеет нечетную единственность, тогда как божественное и человеческое яв-
ляются лишь ее модальностями. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что Делёз реактуа-
лизирует и углубляет гераклитовскую интуицию за счет переосмысления спинозизма, 
особенно спинозовской теории атрибутов как двумерно бесконечных однозначных 
форм субстанции-Природы. Тем самым гераклито-спинозианский Мир-природа по-
стулируется Делёзом, во-первых, как общее онтологическое состояние бесконечного 
и конечного и, во-вторых, как принцип индивидуации всех внутримирных простран-
ственно-временных существ. Таким образом, под влиянием двух немецких филосо-
фов — К. Левица и О. Финка и углубляя их гераклитовскими идеями Делёз создал свою 
собственную теорию мира-природы или онтологию единственности, которая нашла 
свое наиболее ясное и  глубокое выражение в  его творческой интерпретации теории 
атрибутов Б. Спинозы. 
Ключевые слова: мир, космология, однозначность, К. Левиц, О. Финк, Ж. Делёз, Гера-
клит, Б. Спиноза.
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